This morning, June 29, 2026, the Alaska Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case Dan J. Sullivan vs. Division of Elections, a case concerning the eligibility of a man named Daniel J. Sullivan, Jr. to appear on the November ballot alongside the incumbent Senator Daniel S. Sullivan.
Both Democrats and Republicans recognize the race for Alaska’s open U.S. Senate seat as a key race with substantial impacts on both the State of Alaska and the nation. The major players in the race are incumbent U.S. Senator Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska), who has been serving Alaska in the U.S. Senate for 10 years, and Democrat Mary Peltola, who represented Alaska in the House of Representatives from 2022-2024. Recently, a high-profile controversy has resulted from the filing for candidacy of Daniel J. Sullivan, Jr., a teacher from Petersburg with the same first and last name as the incumbent Senator.
After concerns were raised that Petersburg Dan filed with intent to confuse the ballot rather than to legitimately run for office, the Division of Elections launched an investigation. On June 15, after questioning Petersburg Dan and reviewing the evidence, the Division of Elections decided that Petersburg Dan did not properly file and could not appear on the August primary ballot. Petersburg Dan appealed the decision on June 22. On June 27, the Superior Court ruled in favor of Petersburg Dan, stating he could not be barred from the ballot. The Division of Elections then appealed the ruling to the Alaska Supreme Court.
State’s Argument: Authority to Disqualify for Intentional Confusion
Christopher Murray, representing the Division of Elections, framed the case around “first principles”: elections exist to accurately ascertain the public will, and ballots exist to fairly convey voter intent. He invoked Alaska precedent and statutory duties (including the Division’s charge under AS 15.15.030 to facilitate fairness, simplicity, and clarity and to reflect the voter’s intent) to argue that the Division must safeguard ballot integrity when a candidate’s actions threaten to mislead voters.
The State’s central claim is that Daniel J. Sullivan Jr. filed his declaration of candidacy not to distinguish himself or seek office but to deliberately “confuse himself” with the sitting U.S. Senator Dan Sullivan. Murray contended this purpose would undermine the ballot’s function, particularly in Alaska’s top-four primary, by causing voters intending to support the incumbent to mistakenly select the challenger. He argued the Division is not obligated to deploy design tools to mitigate confusion where the confusion is the candidate’s clear objective; instead, the Division may disqualify the filing as not “properly filed.”
To locate authority, Murray pointed to AS 15.25.030 (declaration of candidacy), emphasizing the certification that the declaration is “true and complete” and drawing an implied good-faith requirement that the filing be for the purpose of actually seeking office. He linked this to the Division’s duty under AS 15.15.030 to produce ballots that most accurately reflect voter intent. He cited the administrative regulation 6 AAC 25.260 (limiting director’s review to grounds related to qualifications addressed in the declaration), asserting the Division acted within that scope by evaluating the declaration’s content and associated records. He further referenced AS 15.25.060’s “properly filed” language as the statutory hook for excluding filings that subvert the ballot’s integrity.
Murray highlighted factual signals of intent, notably that Mr. Sullivan initially asked to be listed as “Dan S. Sullivan”—mirroring the incumbent’s middle initial—before retracting eight hours later. He argued this was not an innocent error but part of a pattern. Responding to questions about remedial choices, he maintained disqualification was justified and within the Division’s authority given unprecedented facts. He also urged the Court not to apply the usual canon of resolving ambiguity in favor of ballot access because access here would harm the electorate’s ability to choose, given the name confusion.
On remedies if disqualification is rejected, Murray accepted that the Division must then determine ballot presentation to mitigate confusion (e.g., name formatting, party designation) and asked the Court to allow the Division to make these determinations promptly on remand rather than dictate specifics.
Sullivan’s Argument: Lack of Authority and Constitutional Limits
Jeffrey Robinson, representing Daniel J. Sullivan Jr., argued the Division lacks statutory and regulatory authority to exclude a candidate based on subjective assessments of intent or “good faith.” He asserted the Division’s approach effectively adds a fourth substantive qualification for federal office, violating the U.S. Constitution’s Qualifications Clause, which sets objective criteria: age, duration of citizenship, and residency. Any requirement premised on intent, motive, or viewpoint is subjective, content/viewpoint-adjacent, discretionary, and risks advantaging incumbents.
Robinson emphasized Alaska’s regulations (6 AAC 25.260) strictly limit the Division’s qualification review to grounds in the complaint related to qualifications addressed in the declaration. He contended there is no statutory or regulatory authority to police motives. He distinguished permissible state power under the federal Time, Place, and Manner Clause (Article I, Section 4), which encompasses neutral, non-discriminatory procedures (deadlines, signature thresholds, formatting), from impermissible substantive disqualifications based on intent to confuse.
He underscored that potential confusion is a ballot-design problem within the Division’s ministerial function, not a basis for exclusion. He noted the Division initially certified Mr. Sullivan’s declaration as Republican and indicated his name would appear as “Sullivan, Dan J.”—demonstrating that middle initials and formatting can distinguish candidates. He cautioned against slippery-slope policing of candidate motives, pointing out that people run for many reasons (issue advocacy, long-term support-building), and these do not justify disqualification absent explicit legal standards.
Robinson argued that if the Division wants additional guardrails, it could promulgate neutral, prospective regulations (e.g., signature thresholds), but cannot, in the current framework, impose a subjective “good faith” filter. He also addressed comparisons to other cases: anti-subversion oaths have been struck as violating the Qualifications Clause, and the “None of the Above” Louisiana case involved a candidate’s legal name change post-certification— the lesson being that states should rely on neutral formatting rules and actual names rather than subjective intent assessments. On process, he maintained he challenged the Division’s authority rather than granular fact findings, insisting those findings were made without legal authorization.
Judicial Scrutiny of the Division’s Authority and Actions
The justices pressed both sides on statutory grounding and limiting principles. Justice Henderson asked where AS 15.15.030 imposes the contested requirement and where AS 15.25.030 states a declaration must be for actually seeking office. She characterized the Division’s proposed standard as amorphous and broad, raising concerns about what “intent” encompasses and how the framework would constrain discretion. Justice Aravik highlighted the distinction between seeking to become a candidate versus seeking to be an office holder, probing the Division’s premise that lack of intent to serve could justify disqualification. He questioned why the Division chose the most extreme remedy when it controls the ballot design and has tools to mitigate confusion.
Justice Page asked where the specific disqualification authority rests and whether ambiguity exists. He raised the principle from Alaska Democratic Party v. Beecher that ambiguity in election statutes should be resolved in favor of eligibility, asking why that should not apply here. Chief Justice Carney questioned why the Division took the “most extreme possible remedy” rather than lesser measures, and whether voters could be trusted to distinguish between two similarly named candidates, noting that the similarity is a reality.
The Court scrutinized the regulatory scope of 6 AAC 25.260, which confines director review to qualifications addressed in the declaration, and challenged the Division’s inference of good faith from certification language. Multiple justices suggested the Division conflated potential confusion, which it can mitigate through presentation, with the necessity of exclusion. They also probed whether the Superior Court overreached by dictating ballot listing specifics and whether any party had preserved arguments about alternative ballot formatting decisions.
Overall, the bench exhibited skepticism about the Division’s asserted authority to divine and act on subjective intent without explicit statutory authorization, and emphasized the availability of less drastic, design-based remedies within the Division’s control.
The Court’s decision is expected by tomorrow, June 30, 2026, to meet ballot printing deadlines.
Full Hearing
Listen to the full Alaska Supreme Court hearing here: Alaska Supreme Court: State of Alaska, Division of Elections v. Daniel J. Sullivan, Jr.
