The community of Tok, deep in Interior Alaska, became a hub of forestry expertise this week, as professionals from across the state convened for the three-day annual meeting of the Alaska Society of American Foresters.
Organized by the Tanana chapter under Chairman Jeremy Douse, the gathering featured more than a dozen insightful presentations covering the latest updates in forestry management and Alaska Division of Forestry operations.
Attendees praised the line-up of speakers, noting that every presentation was “timely, succinct, and enlightening,” reflecting a growing urgency in addressing the complex issues facing Alaska’s forests and fire suppression strategies.
Two major topics dominated the meeting: Timber carbon credits and fires started in urban encampments
Timber carbon credits and Senate Bill 48
If Alaska sells timber off as carbon credits and the forests burn, does Alaska have to give the money back to the purchaser of the credits? Does this liability stretch to the life of the carbon credits when the cash is paid up front? It’s a question that is being asked as the state moves into the global carbon credit business, and the foresters attending the meeting discussed it at length.
The rapidly evolving field of timber carbon credits and implications of Senate Bill 48, signed into law in Alaska in 2023, which laid the foundation for the state’s entry into the carbon credit market, is an arcane, but important topic. Key updates highlighted the continued significance of Alaska-based sales, including the Chugach Alaska Corporation’s transaction, currently the largest known sale in North America, and Sealaska’s sale, the second largest.
Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources is expected to open a public comment period in early 2026 regarding its carbon credit sales strategy. Meanwhile, Doyon, Limited is emerging as another major player exploring this industry.
However, challenges remain. Who is responsible for fire suppression on carbon credit land? Who is responsible for fire suppression for carbon credit land owned by Native corporations?
If a private company is paid today for promising to not log specific land for 40 years, or 100 years, and that land is now designated as not eligible for fire suppression (called “limited”), does the private company pick up the suppression costs?
The concepts of fire suppression costs on lands enrolled in credit programs are emerging as potentially costly and complicated issues. Notably, there is currently no compliance carbon market — either voluntary or regulatory — for lands north of the Alaska Range.
Only Michigan, to date, has sold carbon credits as a state government entity, placing them into the voluntary market, which has recently softened significantly. While the market has gone flat, Alaska even has not gone through the public comment period.
New fire suppression threats from urban encampments
A second pressing issue brought forth during the meeting was the unprecedented wildfire risk posed by homeless encampments, particularly in Anchorage.
Speakers emphasized that such encampments represent a new and unpredictable fire threat that defies the typical patterns of Alaska wildfires.
While it remains impossible to predict the severity of a fire season in advance, experts warned that fires originating in homeless shantytowns could blur the line between urban fires and traditional wildfires. Because these encampments often involve flammable structures, outdoor fires, use of gasoline or other propellents as starter, and because they exist outside standard regulatory frameworks, the threat to surrounding areas during periods of low humidity and high winds is especially serious. This year, the wildfire season in Anchorage started early, due to low snowfall over the winter.
Forest fire managers may need the state to communicate clearly with municipal governments to let them know that local resources would be on the hook for suppression costs when fires start within city limits and then spread outside the city limits.
Current agreements used annually to allocate suppression costs — especially involving federal partners like the Departments of Interior and Agriculture — default to state payment through disaster declarations unless otherwise specified.
Redundancy in having the Alaska Departments of Law, and Natural Resources, and the 34th Alaska Legislature alert at least the Municipality of Anchorage of a potentially costly conflagration is one recommendation. The 1994 Miller’s Reach II Fire, in Big Lake cost about $50 million ($170 million in 2025 dollars) and was likely started by fireworks (as the Miller’s Reach I fire, a few days earlier was). It destroyed 344 structures in addition to the basic suppression costs.
With wildfire suppression costs having risen exponentially since the 1990s, attendees were reminded that suppression costs are just part of the picture. The damage to property and structures adds another layer of financial strain. A single wildfire ignited in a homeless encampment could require at least tens of millions of dollars to extinguish—underscoring the need for proactive planning and clear financial policies. In recent years a $60 million Alaska fire year is a larger year, but the homeless encampment situation might bring Alaska its first $100 million year.